Barbara Mcwilliams, et al. v. Olympia Sales Company, a Corporation, and State Insurance Fund : Defendant\u27s Brief by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1968
Barbara Mcwilliams, et al. v. Olympia Sales
Company, a Corporation, and State Insurance
Fund : Defendant's Brief
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Robert D. Moore; Attorney for Defendants
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, McWilliams v. Olympia Sales, No. 11043 (1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3321
! 
l 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA McWILLIAMS, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
OLYMPIA SALES COMPANY, 
a corporation, and STATE IN-
SURANCE FUND, 
Defendants and ReapmidenU. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
110418 
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF DECISION AND ORDER 01' T8B 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAB 
ROBERTS & POOLE 
By THERON E. ROBERTS 
111 Broadway Street 
Boise, Idaho 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
ROBERT D. MOO:aE 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendants 
F ~LED 
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ·········------·-·-----------····· 1 
ARGUMENT --------····---·-·--·-----·-----·-·········-----·-----······ 9 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID 
NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE AP-
PLICANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY 
BENEFITS BY REASON OF THE ACCI-
DENT TO MR. McWILLIAMS ON JULY 22, 
1964. ·--------------------------------------··-·-------------------------·---··---- 9 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION'S ORDER CANNOT 
HE OVERTURNED ON THE GROUNDS 
THAT THE COMMISSION FAILED TO 
SUBMIT THE MEDICAL ASPECTS OF 
THE CASE TO AN IMPARTIAL MEDICAL 
PANEL. ----------·----------------------·--···----·------···················· 17 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ESTOP-
PED FROM DENYING LIABILITY FOR 
APPLICANTS' DEATH BENEFITS ............. 19 
CONCLUSION-------·--------·--·-····------·-··---------·----······---24 
Cases Cited 
Campbell vs. Eagle and Blue Bell Mining Co., 
64 U. J.30, 231 Pac. 620 ------------·----··-····-··--··· 13, 15 
Carter vs. The Industrial Commission, 76 Utah 520, 
290 Pac. 2nd 776 ····---·-·-·---····-···-·--···········-······--·--22 
Garner vs. Hecla Mining Co., 19 Utah 2nd 367, 
431 Pac. 2nd 794 --··--·-··········-·-····························· 16 
Page 
Halling YS. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah 112, 
362 Pac. 78 --------------------------------------------·--··-····-·----24 
Harding vs. Industrial Commission, 83 Utah 376, 
28 Pac. 2nd 183 ------------------------------------·------- 23, 24 
Kavalinakis vs. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 
17 4, 246 Pac. 698 -------------------------------·-----------··-·· 13 
Kent vs. Industrial Commission, 89 Utah 381, 
57 Pac. 2nd 724 ----··-------····------····----········-·····-······ 13 
.Mellen vs. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2nd 367, 
431 Pac. 2nd 798 --------···---------·---------·--·---···------···· 16 
Salt Lake City vs. The Industrial Commission, 
61 Utah 514, 251 Pac. 1047 --··-·····---··············---21 
Spencer vs. Industrial Commission, 4 Utah 2nd 185, 
290 Pac. 2nd 692 ----------------------------------------- ... ------- 22 
Taggart vs. Industrial Commission, 79 Utah 598, 
12 Pac. 2nd 356 ---------------------------------------------------- 23 
Thompson vs. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2nd 
394, 427 Pac. 2nd 394 ------------·-····················--··---· 14 
Utah Fuel Company vs. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 67 Utah 25, 245 Pac. 381 --------·------- 22, 23 
Yause vs. Industrial Commission. 17 Utah 2nd 214, 
402 Pac. 2nd 1006 -·---------···--··--··-----·····--·····----··--· 12 
Statutes Cited 
:3.5-1-77 Utah Code Annotated ( 19.53) .................... 7 
:~.>-1-78 l:tah Code Annotated ( 1953) ____________ 21, 24 
35-2-56 Utah Code Annotated (1953) ----········--··---- 7 
Text Cited 
100 C.J.S. Sec. 657 p. fHH, 992, 993 ---------------- 21, 22 
.. 
11 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA Mc"TILLIAl\IS, et al., ' 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, ) 
vs. ' ' Case No. OLYMPIA SALES COMPANY, ( 
a corporation, and STATE IN- \ 
SURANCE FUND, ' 
Defendants and Respondents. f 
DEFENDAl'J"T'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
11043 
Sterling C. Mc "Tilliams filed an application for 
hearing to settle an industrial claim on November 23, 
1964. In this application he claimed compensation for 
a basal skull fracture (R. 4). The defendants denied 
liability. Subsequent to said denial the parties entered 
into a stipulation and left to the Industrial Commission 
the determination of the question whether or not, at the 
1 
time of the accident, that occurred on July 22 1964 
' ' 
Mr. l\Ic\Villiams was an employee or an independent 
contractor. An order was entered by the Industrial 
Commission dated December 17, 1964 (R. 18 and 19) 
wherein the Industrial Commission stated as follows: 
"One issue to be resol ,·ed is the relationship 
between applicant and the defendant, namely, 
was the applicant an employer or a subcontrac-
t l'' or. 
The Commission found that ou July 2~, 1964 Mr. Mc-
"\Villiams was an employee of the defendant, Olympia 
Sales Company. The Commission held that the appli-
cant's injuries sustained on that date arose out of and 
in the course of his employment, and further required 
i.he defendants to "pay all medical and hospital bills 
incurred as a result of the accidental injury." The order 
left open the question of permanent disability of the 
applicant ( R. 19) . 
This order of December 17, 1964 did not deter-
mine the extent of injury nor did it set forth a basis 
that the applicants in this case, Barbara Mc"\Villiams, 
et al., were entitled to death benefits. This point was 
made clear by the Industrial Commission in its order 
dated September 23, 1965 ( R. 93) wherein the Indus-
trial Commission held as follo-ws: 
"The Commission order of December 17, 
1964 does not determine that the death of Ster-
ling l\ic"\Villiams on March 9, 1965 was caused 
by -the injury of July 22, 19G4." 
2 
After the order of December 17, 1964, Sterling 
McV\Tilliams, on January 14, 1965, requested a change 
of doctors, asking for permission to see a chiropractor 
(R. 21). Dr. llirdsley, a chiropractor, reported on 
January 22, 1965 that Mr. Mc Williams had received 
four adjustments and that progress to that date was 
normal. He commented further that Mr. McWilliams 
'\vas elated" because of the favorable progress that he 
had noted in his condition ( R. 24) . 
The record indicates that the Industrial Commis-
sion's and the defendants' first knowledge of difficul-
ties relating to a heart condition was Dr. Evans' report 
(R. 20, 25, 26 and 27) which was dated and received 
in January 1965. 
On February 25, 1965, Mr. Mc\Villiams was ex-
amined at the request of the defendant, the State In-
surance ]'und, by Dr. L. E. Viko. Dr. Viko, in his 
report to the Insurance Fund, noted that he examined 
Mr. MdVilliams on February 25, 1965, and based upon 
this examination and after discussion with his treating 
physician Dr. Evans, Mr. McWilliams left for the 
hospital promptly for the insertion of a cardiac pace-
maker (R. 36). The pacemaker was surgically im-
planted on February 26, 1965, by Dr. Russell M. N el-
son and the day subsequent to his discharge from the 
hospital on March 3, 1965, he died at his home. 
On the 15th day of March, 1965, the applicants, 
Barbara Mc Williams and her children through their 
attorney, filed an application to settle an industrial 
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accident, claiming death benefits, alleging that the basal 
skull fracture which occurred ou July 22, 1964 caused 
the <lea th of Mc \V illiams ( R. 42) . 
The defendants denied any liability for the death 
of .Mr. Mc\Villiams and stated, "This case involves 
medical questions and so we respectfully suggest that 
it be ref erred to a medical panel." ( R. 55) The In-
dustrial Commission appointed a medical panel pur-
suant to the provisions of 35-1-77 U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended ( R. 59) . 
The record is clear that both the applicant Bar-
bara l\!IcVVilliams and her attorney received notice of 
the appointment of the medical panel (R. 59). The 
letter of appointment was directed to Dr. L. E. Viko 
asking him to serve along with Dr. Crockett and Dr. 
Kilpatrick. No objection was raised by the applicant 
to the appointment of Dr. Viko. The panel filed its 
report on July 22, 1965. It was specifically stated in 
this panel report that the file of Dr. Viko's examination 
of February 25, 1965 was attached and circulated to 
the members of the panel ( R. 73) . The panel report 
found that the cause of death was due to a cardiac fail-
ure and was brought about by ventricular fibrillation 
occurring in spite of the pacemaker. The panel report 
discussed the possibility of whether or not Mr. MdVil-
liams 'exposure to lacquer fumes on July 22, 1964 and 
the fall contributed to the death: and, concluded that 
it had not. In reviewing this problem the doctors turned 
to experts who had studied the effects of exposure to 
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fumes of this nature. In addition, the U. S. Public 
Service Department was contacted in regards to their 
conclusions in this matter. All of these reports were 
made a part of the industrial file. It was the opinion 
of the panel that there was no association between the 
lacquer exposure and the heart disease that caused the 
death of Mr. McWilliams. 
Pursuant to the procedure of the Industrial Com-
mission, copies of the medical panel report were circu-
lated to all concerned parties. The applicants, within 
the statutory time, objected to the report of the medical 
panel on numerous grounds and for numerous reasons. 
At this point no objections were filed by the applicant 
to the appointment of Dr. Viko by the Industrial Com-
mission to the panel and to the procedure used by the 
panel in arriving at its conclusions ( R. 83, 84 and 85). 
Subsequent to objecting to the medical panel re-
port, the applicants filed a Motion asserting that the 
December 17, 1964 order was "res ajudicata" and that 
the applicants were entitled to death benefits. The 
Commission, in response to this motion, denied the 
same and stated that the December 17, 1964 order did 
not determine the issue of the cause of Mr. Mc,Villiams' 
death and set a hearing based upon the applicants' 
objections to the medical panel report (R. 93). After 
this matter had been continued at the convenience of 
applicant and not until the matter was set for hearing 
did the applicant raise the issue that the medical panel 
report was objected to on the grounds that Dr. Yiko 
had sat on the same (R. 99). 
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Prior to the hearing on the objections to th 
report, the applicant took the depositions of D 
ton and Dr. David, who reside in Boise, Idah 
applicants' brief on file herein quotes at lengt 
the depositions of these doctors. In summary, D 
ton, who is a specialist in orthopedic surgery, co1 
that ~fr. Mc,Villiams' death was due to the f: 
occurred on July 22, 196-J.. Dr. David, who is a 
practitioner at Boise, Idaho, testified that in his 
l\'Ir. l\Ic\Villiams' death was due to the injury r 
on July 22, 1964. Dr. David felt that both the j 
the exposure to the lacquer fumes concurrently l 
about the death of Mr. Mc,Villiams. 
Subsequent to the taking of these deposi1 
hearing was held on the objections to the medical 
report heretofore filed when Dr. Viko was sit 
chairman. Prior to this time Dr. Viko had di 
Dr. Kilpatrick appeared on behalf of the pane 
l~ilpatrick testified that in his opinion there was 
nection between the lacquer exposure and the 1 
heart disease that the deceased had in this paJ 
case. He testified that in his opinion there , 
connection between the fall that Mr. Mc'-" 
had experienced and the resulting problems of hi: 
He further testified that the combination of l 
these factors ·did not contribute to the death (J 
266). 
The applicant at this time introduced into ei 
testimony from friends and relatives of Mr. 1' 
Iiams that described his fainting subsequent to 1 
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and his prior good health. Also, testimony was iniro-
duced by a chiropractor in the form of a written report 
as to his findings prior to the death of Mr. Mc,Villiams. 
Dr. Kilpatrick had an opportunity to sit through the 
entire hearing and was recalled as the last witness. He 
was asked specifically whether or not the testimony 
tendered, in any manner, varied his opinion as to the 
cause of Mr. McWilliams' death. The Doctor testified 
that in his opinion no additional facts had been added 
which would alter his conclusions and opinions ( R. 
312, 313). 
After this hearing the Industrial Commission felt 
it appropriate to appoint another medical panel. .For-
warded to the new panel was all factual information 
presented by the applicants including all medical re-
ports (such as the treating chiropractor's) and the depo-
sitions of Dr. Burton and Dr. David. This panel was 
appointed pursuant to a letter of August 3, 1966. No 
objections were registered by either party to this pro-
cedure. 
35-1-77 refers to 35-2-56 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, 
in setting forth the qualifications of the doctors that 
serve on the medical panel. It states that the appoint-
ment should be made of not less than three physicians 
specializing in the treatment of the disease or the con-
dition involved in the case. In this particular case the 
second medical panel consisted of six specialists. 
This panel filed its report on October 12, 1966. 
The medical panel report, in essence, found that: 
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"It is highly probable that Mr. McWilliams 
had organic heart disease involving the conduc-
tive system of the heart which ante-dated his fall 
and alleged accident and which was responsible 
for the fall and the subsequent progression of the 
heart disease leading to his death. Further, the 
panel finds no evidence that the inhalation of 
lacquer fumes, as alleged, was responsible for 
the heart disease or its consequences." (R. 35) 
It was the opinion of this panel, 
"that it is highly probable that Mr. McWil-
liams had organic heart disease which ante-dated 
his fall and injury of July 22, 1964, and, that 
it was the natural progression of the pre-existing 
heart disease which led to his eventual death on 
March 4, 1965." (R. 347) 
It should be noted that the panel took into con-
sideration the testimony tendered by the applicants' 
doctors, Dr. Burton and Dr. David. The applicant 
objected to the report of the medical panel and pur-
suant to said objections a hearing was held on March I, 
1967 in which Dr. Orme, one of the members of the 
panel, was present. 
The applicant on cross-examination of Dr. Orme 
extensively questioned him concerning the panel's reli-
ance on statements made in hospital records in regards 
to evidence of dizzy spells, claiming that this evi<lencc 
Y•:as mere hearsay. The doctor, however, testified that 
such evidence had no real effect in the ultimate con-
clusion. 
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"Q In other words, your opinions would be 
the same if there was no evidence . at all that 
he had ever had any dizzy spells? 
A Yes sir." (R. 377) 
The Industrial Commission filed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Award on August 14, 1967, 
finding that the applicants were not entitled to receive 
death benefits by reason of the accident that occurred 
to Mr. Mc,:Villiams on July 22, 1964. 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID 
NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE APPLI-
CANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY BENE-
FITS BY REASON OF THE ACCIDENT TO 
MR. McWILLIAMS ON JULY 22, 1964. 
The applicant in her first sentence in her brief 
under Point I properly states the issue to be decided 
by this Court when she states as follows: 
"The principle we contend is the controlling 
factual issue in this case is whether or not the 
heart malfunction of Mc Williams was directly 
related to or caused by the fall McWilliams 
received on July 22, 1964, it having been pre-
viously determined that Mc Williams was acting 
in the course and scope of his employment with 
the defendant Olympia Sales Company at the 
time of the fall". 
The applicant quotes in her brief the first medical panel 
report (R. 73) in part and infers that the panel con-
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sidere<l only two possibilities as a cause for the cardiac 
death. She then urges that by finding that the death 
was caused by a pre-existing condition as opposed to 
the circumstances surrounding the accident of July 22, 
1964 that the findings of the panel were entirely nega-
tive. The position of the applicant, in essence, is that 
this Court should believe the applicant's experts as 
opposed t~ the panel's conclusions. The Hearing Ex-
aminer in this case noted the discrepancy in opinions of 
the physicians that had testified and stated as follows: 
"The hearing examiner is more persuaded on 
the disputed medical facts by the expressed 
opinion of the medical panels which consisted 
of a total of seven internists and cardiologists 
and one neurologist. The evidence of the appli-
cant came from a general practitioner and an 
orthopedic surgeon. I am not persuaded neces-
sarily by numbers, but the qualifications of the 
Commission's special medical p_anel are undis-
puted, and their conclusions must not be dis-
regarded." (R. 386). 
The record in this case consists primarily of exami-
nation and cross examination of medical witnesses. It 
is interesting to note that the appellant in urging this 
Court to disregard the panel's conclusions and adopt 
the opinion of her experts fails t o note that even 
her experts disagree as to the cause of death in this 
matter. On cross examination, Dr. Burton testified as 
follows: 
"Q Dr. Burton, I want to be sure I under-
stand your testimony. Is it not your position that 
the ca~se of the death of Mr. Mc,Villiams was 
IO 
caused--! am not talking about causal connec-
tion, which came first, the egg or the chicken-
! am talking about caused by the fall rather 
than a contribution of the exposure of lacquer 
fumes and the fall? 
"A No. I feel that the lacquer fumes caused 
that original attack of syncope which caused the 
call and the sequence from there on is all in the 
record. 
"Q Therefore, you do not feel that the ex-
posure to the lacquer fumes directly affected 
the heart? 
"A Except on a temporary basis, no. 
"Q And had no appreciable lasting effect as 
far as what progressed later when talking about 
directly affecting the heart? 
"A No, I don't feel so-possible but to me 
not very probable. 
"Q Then you agree with or disagree with Mr. 
David? 
"A I probably do. 
"Q You were here when he gave his testimony 
or the greater majority of it? 
"A Yes. 
"Q And you did understand that his position 
was that there were dual factors that is the direct 
and causal connection of the inhaling of the 
fumes of the lacquer which directly contributed 
to the disease of the heart along with the fall. 
Was that not his position? 
"A I believe so. 
"Q And you disagree with that? 
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"A Yes, pathologically there is no evidence 
of heart disease. It is a functional disease he died 
from rather than anything else." (R. 155, 156) 
The issue presented in this appeal is not whether 
or not this Court should examine the voluminous medi-
cal records and testimony and decide whether or not to 
believe the applicants' experts as opposed to the medi-
cal panel's conclusions, but rather whether or not the 
Commission's holdings and order in this case is such, that 
the Commission's action can be said to be arbitrary and 
capricious. This Court has on many occasions been 
faced with the problem that is presented by appellants' 
theory in urging this Court to chose between the opinions 
of experts at an industrial hearing and to overturn the 
Industrial Commission's findings. It is agreed that 
plaintiff's doctors felt there was a connection between 
the injury arising out of the accident of July 22nd and 
the resulting death of Mr. :Mc,Villiams. There is no 
doubt, however, that there was contrary medical testi-
mony that the death of Mr. ~IdVilliams was not so 
related but was rather due to a pre-existing condition. 
This Court has pointed out in Vause v. Industrial 
Commission, 17 Utah 2d 217, 407 P. 2d 1006, that our 
"statutory and decisional law require us to look at the 
cYidence in the light most favorable to the Commission's 
finding and it is the obligation of the parties involved 
to so present the matter to the Court." 
It is respectfully submitted that the applicant in 
this case in· quoting at length from her doctors' testi-
12 
mony is rearguing a factual question that has been <le-
termined by the Commission and has set no basis for 
this Court to find that the Commission acted arbitrary 
and capricious. 
It is fundamental that the findings of the Indus-
trial Commission on conflicting medical testimony can-
not be disturbed on appeal. As early as 1924 this Court 
in Campbell v. Eagle and Blue Bell Mining Compan.11, 
64 Utah 430, 231 Pac. 620, articulated the rule in cases 
of this kind and the Court stated as fallows: 
"The testimony taken before the Commission 
consists entirely of the opinions of medical ex-
perts with the exception of the testimony of the 
applicant, Campbell. This testimony is con-
flicting. \Ve can see nothing in this record for 
review except the findings of the Commission 
based upon conflicting testimony. The testimony 
was competent and material to the issues to be 
determined by the Commission, and on that 
testimony the Commission made its findings. 
This court, in proceedings of this character, is 
without power to disturb the findings of the 
Commission based upon competent conflicting 
testimony. The statute so provides, and the court 
has so decided in numerous opinions. It is wholly 
immaterial that this court, or the individual 
members thereof, might have come to a different 
conclusion than that reached by the Commission. 
The Commission's findings are binding when 
supported by competent, material testimony." 
Also see Kent v. Industrial Commission, 89 Utah 
381, 57 P. 2d 724 and Kavalinakis v. Industrial Corn-
mi8sion, 67 Utah 174, 246 Pac. 698. 
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A rather recent Utah case facing the issue of a pre-
existing condition as being the cause for the disability 
as versus an accident is 11hompson v. Industrial Com-
,mU,·sion, 19 Utah 2d 129, 427 P. ~d 394. That case pre-
sented a fact situation where the Industrial Commission 
adopted the medical panel report. The medical panel 
report stated that there was "no good evidence that the 
alleged injury on or about July 17, 1964 had any re-
lationship ... " with the accident in question. The appli-
cant in that case attacked the Commission's order on 
appeal in essence on the same grounds that the appel-
lant is now urging on this Court. For example, the 
applicant argues on page 7 of her brief that there was 
"no evidence" of heart disease which pre-existed the fall 
and further they argue that the autopsy does not cor-
roborate the theory that there was a pre-existing con-
dition. The doctors in sustaining the medical panel 
report recognize this fact and have repeatedly pointed 
out the same in both their reports and testimony and 
notwithstanding this lack of evidence find in their 
opinion that there is no connection between the accident 
in question and the resulting cardiac death. On page 
30 of her brief the appellant urges that the testimony 
of the plaintiffs' doctors as versus the panel's doctors 
should be believed because one may relate "common 
sense and experience with life." As stated earlier, this 
was the same argument that was made by the applicant 
in Thompson v. Industrial Commission, supra. The 
court, however, held as follows: 
14 
"It appears that the Commission based its 
decision upon the conflicting medical opinions. 
We must conclude that the order was based upon 
competent evidence. There is nothing in the 
record to in di ca te that the Commission acted 
capriciously or arbitrarily". 
Citing Carnpbell v. Eayle and Blue Bell 1lfining Com-
pany, supra. 
As mentioned earlier, the panel fully recognized 
that there was no objective evidence in regard to a pre-
existing condition. In regard to this issue, however, the 
panel stated as follows : 
"The panel reviewed and discussed, with in-
terest, the information in the file concerning the 
possible causal relationship between the inhala-
tion of the lacquer fumes and Mr. McWilliams' 
fall and head injury and the possible relationship 
of these events to his heart block and subsequent 
death ... 
"The panel recognizes and notes the fact that 
the file contains statements of several individuals 
which attest to Mr. WcWilliams excellent health 
and lack of symptoms related to his heart or 
nervous system prior to his alleged accident. 
Moreover, the panel recognizes that the previous 
medical panel and the pathologist who performed 
the autopsy on Mr. McWilliams found no evi-
dence of significant organic disease of the heart 
or nervous system prior to the insertion of the 
electrical pace making device. The panel agrees 
with other opinions contained in the file that it 
is regrettable th~t no detailed i?f.ormation ~eems 
to exist concernmg Mr. Mc W 1lhams cardiac or 
nenous system status prior to July 22, 1964. 
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In spite of the above considerations, it is the 
opinion of the present panel that it is highly 
probable that Mr. Mc\Villiams had organic 
heart disease which ante-dated his fall and injury 
on July 22, 1964, and, that it is the natural prog-
ress of the pre-existing heart disease which led 
to his eventual death on March 4, 1965." 
The argument used by plaintiffs in this case was 
also urged upon this Court in a recent decision entitled 
Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 373, 431 
Pac. 2d 798, in which this Court sustained the Commis-
sion's order in adopting the medical panel report. In 
the Mellen case the appellant complained that the medi-
cal panel was using an improper criteria and was failing 
to examine other evidence and as such the award of 
the Commission should be reversed. The court held that 
the Commission did not err in adopting the panel report 
and cited Garner v. Hecla Mining Company, 19 Utah 
2d 367, 431 P. 2d 794, which held: 
"The insuperable difficulty in plaintiff's attack 
on the Commission's finding is that they im-
properly attempt to focus consideration of the 
issues exclusively upon their own view of the 
evidence and theories of the case. While some 
aspects of the statistical data and medical theo-
ries harmonized with their contention, others 
failed to do so ... Consistent with the foregoing 
and corroborating the existence of unknown 
factors and uncertainty as to causation, is the 
report of the medical panel to which this case 
was referred for examination: 'We cannot con-
firm that the lung carcinoma was caused by 
exposure to uranium mining occupation.' There 
16 
is thus a reasonable basis in the evidence for the 
refusal of the Commission to find in accordance 
""'.ith the plaintiff's contention. Upon the prin-
ciples stated above it is our duty to affirm the 
decision." 
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that the 
appellant in this case is asking this Court to discount 
the two medical panels that were heretofore appointed 
and to adopt the testimony tendered on behalf of the 
applicant. As stated above, the doctors supporting the 
medical panel's report conclude that Mr. MdVilliams' 
death was not due to the accident in July 1964, but 
rather was due to a pre-existing condition. Certainly, 
there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for the refusal 
of the Commission to find in accordance with the plain-
tiff's contention. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION'S ORDER CANNOT 
BE OVERTURNED ON THE GROUNDS 
THAT THE COMMISSION FAILED TO SUB-
MIT THE MEDICAL ASPECTS OF THE 
CASE TO AN IMPARTIAL MEDICAL PANEL. 
There is no doubt that Dr. L. E. Viko, Chairman 
of the first medical panel, examined the applicant Ster-
ling Mc\Villiams for the defendant, the State Insurance 
Fund. It should be noted, however, that the objection, 
that Dr. Viko should not have been a member of the 
medical panel, was not raised by the applicant timely. 
The record is clear that prior to Dr. Yiko's sitting on 
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the first medical panel, llarbara Mc\'Villiams and her 
attorney received notice of the appointment of the 
medical panel and the fact that Dr. Viko was going to 
sit as chairman (R. 59). There was no objection raised 
at this time by the applicant to the appointment of Dr. 
Yiko. The panel report clearly showed that Dr. Yiko 
had examined the patient and that his findings were 
contained as part of the industrial report (R. 73). After 
the panel report was filed, the applicant objected to the 
medical panel. However, she did not object to the fact 
that Dr. Viko sat as chairman on said panel (R. 83, 8.J. 
and 85). lt was not until after the matter had been set 
for hearing, based upon the objections, did the appli-
cant raise the issue that the medical panel report was 
void for the reason that Dr. Yiko had sat on said panel 
(R. 99). The first notice therefore that the applicant 
disagreed to this matter was after the time set for the 
hearing on the objections. 
Even assuming that the applicant had not waived 
her right to this objection by waiting until after the 
results of the panel decision were made, it appears that 
the point is academic. After this objection was raised 
a new medical panel was appointed. No objection was 
made to the appointment of the new medical panel nor 
the information that was contained in the file that they 
were to consider. Therefore, even assuming that the 
Commission did not act wisely in allowing Dr. Yiko to 
sit on the medical panel, certainly the appointment of 
a new and impartial medical panel would correct this 
error, if there was one. 
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POINT III 
THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ES-
TOPPED .FROM DENYING LIABILITY FOll 
APPLICANT'S DEATH BENEFITS. 
Plaintiffs' introductory sentence in her brief under 
Point III is not accurate. Plaintiff states "After De-
cedent's initial treatment by Dr. Karowites (sic) on 
July 22, 1964 all medical examinations and treatment 
was performed and administered by physicians author-
ized and compensated by the employer's surety, Stale 
Insurance Fund." The only evidence in regard to th~ 
question of authorization and compensation was the 
testimony taken on July 6, 1966 when counsel for the 
plaintiffs called Mr. Kirkham, Chief Claims Adjuster 
for the State Insurance Fund. This witness made it 
clear (R. 306) that the defendant, the State Insurance 
Fund, did not authorize any treatment for the decedent 
in this case. Further, the defendants did not compen·· 
sate Dr. Evans, the decedent's doctor (R. 310, 311, 
317). Mr. Kirkham did explain that if a claimant is 
desirous of changing doctors after the initial treatment, 
then the authority must be receiYed by the Industrial 
Commission, not the State Insurance Fund. The prem-
ise, therefore, for plaintiff's argument that all medical 
examination and treatment was authorized and com-
pensated by the employer's surety, the State Insurance 
Fund, is not true and, in fact, this assertion is contrary 
to the evidence. 
The plaintiff in her second paragraph under Point 
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111 seems to indicate that the defendant, the State In-
surance Fund, had notice of the decedent's heart concli-
tio11 prior to December 7, 1964<. The record is clear, 
however, that the first notice of any difficulty in regard 
to heart disease was the surgeon's report which was filed 
January 8, 1965. This was some time after the stipula-
tion in regard to the issue, of whether or not lVIr . .Mc-
Williams was an employee, was submitted to the Com-
mission and almost a month after the Commission had 
set forth its Order of December 17, 1964. The first 
formal report from Dr. Evans as to the type of treat-
ment and the decedent's difficulties was a report dated 
January 25, 196.5 and received by the Industrial Com-
mission on 1\'Iarch 25, 1965 ( R. 25) . The applicant, 
l\'.Ir. Sterling C. McWilliams, informed the Industrial 
Commission that he was being treated by Dr. Evans on 
.January 14, 1965, in which he made a request to the 
Industrial Commission that he be allowed permission to 
seek the services of a chiropractor (R. 21). 
It is clear, therefore, that plaintiff's basis for alleg-
ing an estoppel is based upon factual considerations that 
are not accurate. In the first place, the defendant did 
r~ot authorize and afford compensation for treatment 
fur heart disease; secondly, there is no evidence that the 
(kfendant ha.cl any knowledge of the difficulties of the 
applicant in regard to cardiac disease until subsequent 
to the Commission's order of December 17, 1964. 
The Commission's order of December 17th. HHH 
did not make a determination that Sterling Mc,Yil-
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Hams' incapacity was caused by the injury of July :2:2, 
1964. The order of the Commission was that the de-
fendant pay all medical and hospital bills incurred as a 
result of the accidental injury ( R. 19). At the time the 
order was entered by the Commission the only knmd-
edge of injuries was the claim for compensation based 
upon a basal skull fracture. On February 25th the 
applicant was examined by Dr. Viko (R. 34). Dr. 
Yiko, sensing an emergency, contacted Dr. Evans and 
the defendant was admitted immediately to the hospital 
because of the emergency situation. 
The plaintiff cites as authority 100 C.J .S. §657'. 
This encyclopedia, however, in regard to the issue of 
res judicata sets forth generally two classification:; 
where matters are held to be res judicata and where 
matters are held not to be res judicata. The text states 
that matters are res judicata as to facts on which juris-
diction depends, i.e., employment of the employee, the 
relationship between the parties, etc. ( 100 C.J.S. §657, 
p. 991). It is stated, however, on page 992 that under 
the circumstances of this case the order of December 17, 
1964 was not res judicata: 
"ft! atters held not res iudicatn. Under a stat-
ute authorizing a reYision because of change of 
condition, an award is not a final adjudication 
as to the degree of injury sustained." 
It should be pointed out that Utah has such a statute. 
See 35-1-78, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, which proYicles 
in essence that the power and jurisdiction of the In-
dustrial Commission is a continuing one and the C01;1-
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m1ss1011 has authority to make such modification or 
changes as in its opinion may be justified. The Utah 
cases construing this statute have articulated the right 
of the Industrial Commission to modify a decree when 
there has been a change of circumstances. See Salt 
Lake City v. 11he Industrial Cummissio·n, 61 Utah 5H 
) 
251 Pac. 1047; Carter v. The Industrial Commission 
' 
76 Utah 520, 290 P. 2d 776. Our court has also spoken 
to the issue of res judicata and has held that the doc-
trine of res judicata which is applicable in a court 
proceeding is not in the strict sense applicable to pro-
ceedings before an Industrial Commission, Spencer v. 
Industrial Commission, 4 Utah 2d 185, 290 P. 2d 692. 
100 C.J.S., §657, 993, sets forth the applicable law 
in cases of this kind when it states as follows: 
"VVhere an injured employee files a claim for 
an injury and the Commission is not advised that 
he had i:;eceived a second injury and the hearing 
is limited solely to the first injury, the order of 
the Commission goes only to the first injury and 
thereafter the Commission may hear and deter-
mine claimant's right to compensation for the 
second injury . . . In order for the doctrine of 
res judicata to apply, the subject matter of the 
second proceeding must be the same; and so, al-
thoLtgh a view to the contrary has been taken, it 
has been held that a wife applying for compensa-
tion for the death of her son is not bound by 
findings in her prior proceedings for compensa-
tion for the death of her h~lSband in the same 
accident that she was wholly dependent on the 
husband, which findings were based on the stat-
utory presumption to that effect." Citing Utah 
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Fuel Company v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 67 Utah 25, 245 Pac. 381. 
lt is defendant's position, therefore, that the order 
of December 17, 1964 did not speak to the issue of 
whether or not the basal skull fracture caused the car-
diac problem; secondly, that the Commission's order 
specifically limited its award to injuries caused by the 
accident; further, that the doctrine of res judicata is 
not applicable in the State of Utah in matters of this 
kind (See 35-1-78, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, and the 
cases construing the same) . Even if the doctrine of res 
judicata would be applicable, the applicant in this case 
cannot rely on this doctrine because she was a different 
party than the applicant in the original proceedings. 
It is defendants' position that the two Utah cases 
in regards to this matter, that is Taggart v. Industrial 
Commission, 79 Utah 598, 12 P. 2d 356, and Harding 
v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 83 Utah 376 28 P.2d 
182, clearly show that the defendant is not estopped in 
this case. In the Taggart case, supra, the issue presented 
was whether or not the hemorrhage to an ulcer in the 
right nostril was due to an accident or was a disease un-
related to compensation coverage. In that case it ap-
peared that the surety had paid compensation for tempo-
rary total disability for a period from August 11th to 
Sepetmber 9th. The applicant claimed that the surety 
was, therefore, es topped from denying liability for the 
death. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this theory 
and held that the employer's insurance carrier's pay-
ment of compensation did not preclude it from denying 
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that the employee met with au accident causing death. 
Citing Halling v. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah 11:.:l, 
263 Pac. 78. 
The Harding case mentioned above clearly pre-
sents the proper rule as set forth in appellants' brief on 
page 39. The court found estoppel in that case. How-
ever, medical care had been furnished for over five 
years and, in fact, by making such payment the lapse 
of time was so great that the statute of limitations may 
have been successfully urged against any such action 
and as such the court found actual prejudice. 
lt is clear that the defendants are not estoppe<l 
from denying liability in this matter since at the initial 
hearing no knowledge was had as to a cardiac problem; 
secondly, no treatment was paid for or authorized by 
the surety, and, the apylicant was not misled nor pre-
judiced and thus the defendant is not estopped from 
denying liability. 
CONCLUSION 
The actions of the Industrial Commission iu this 
case cannot be said to be arbitrary and capricious an<l 
as such the Commission's ruling should be sustained 
by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT D. _LVIOORE 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Respondents 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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